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Abstract
We demonstrate that the notions of duality and anti-duality are useful for
analyzing several properties for single-valued solutions for coalitional games
with economic applications. First, we propose a new monotonic property de-
rived from the anti-dual of population monotonicity. Using the notion of
anti-duality, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which the new monotonic
property is satised by a single-valued solution on the domain of convex games.
Next, using the notion of duality and axioms involved in several axiomatiza-
tions of the Shapley rule for airport problems, we axiomatize the Shapley
rule for liability problems, bidding ring problems, and polluted river problems.
Finally, using the notion of anti-duality, we uncover the hidden relationship
between the nucleolus rules for claims problems and for public good problems.
Keywords: duality; anti-duality; population monotonicity; allocation prob-
lems; axiomatization; the Shapley value; nucleolus
JEL classi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1 Introduction
In claims problems, Thomson and Yeh (2008) introduced operators on the
space of division rules and uncovered the underlying structure of the space of
division rules. The notion of dualityplays an important role in their analysis.
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For each claims problem, this notion gives us the dual of the problem. Also,
the notion of duality is applied to division rules: A division rule is said to be
self-dual, if the outcome this division rule chooses for each claims problem
and the outcome the same division rule chooses for the dual of each claims
problem always coincide with each other.
Analogously to claims problems, one can dene dual games and dual
solutionsin cooperative game theory. These concepts can help us to uncover
the hidden structure of solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations on the domain
of all coalitional games with transferable utility (TU games, for short) (Funaki
1998). However, the notion of duality for TU games has weakness: First,
particular domains of TU games (for instance, the classes of balanced games
and convex games) are not closed under the duality operator. Second, although
the Shapley value is a self-dual solution on the domain of all TU games, there
are few self-dual solutions.
Oishi et al. (2013) proposed the notion of anti-duality for TU games.
Given a TU game v, the anti-dual of the game, introduced by Oishi and
Nakayama (2009), is dened as the dual of  v. One can also dene the notion
of a self-anti-dual solution. Unlike the notion of duality, the notion of anti-
duality has the following advantages: Important classes of games, such as the
class of balanced games and the class of convex games, are closed under the
anti-duality operator. Also, there are many self-anti-dual solutions on the class
of all TU games, on the class of balanced games, and on the class of convex
games.1 Taking advantage of these facts, Oishi et al. (2013) axiomatized
the core (Gillies 1959) on the domain of balanced games, the Shapley value
(Shapley 1953) on the domain of all TU games, and the Dutta-Ray solution
(Dutta and Ray 1989) on the domain of convex games.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the notions of duality and
anti-duality are useful in di¤erent contexts. We follow three strategies.
First, we derive a new monotonic property as the anti-dual of population
monotonicity. Population monotonicity (Thomson 1983) states that if new
agents arrive, the payo¤s to agents that are present initially have to increase.
The monotonicity property we propose says that if the contribution of agents
to a particular coalition to which they do not belong is the coalitional worth for
the agents in a new game, then they weakly gain in this game. We refer to it as
coalitional contribution monotonicity. Hokari and Gellekom (2002) provided
su¢ cient conditions for a single-valued solution to be population monotonic on
the domain of convex games. Using anti-duality, we derive su¢ cient conditions
for a single-valued solution to be coalitional contribution monotonic on the
1For instance, on the domain of all TU games, the Shapley value, the prenucleolus, the
modied nucleolus, and the prekernel are se-anti-dual solutions; on the domain of balanced
games, the core, the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the modied nucleolus, and the prekernel
are self-anti-dual solutions; and on the domain of convex game, the core, the Shapley value,
the nucleolus, and the Dutta-Ray solution are self-anti-dual solutions (see Oishi et al. 2013).
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domain of convex games.
Next, we apply the notion of duality to airport problems, bidding ring
problems, liability problems, and polluted river problems. Airport prob-
lems are cost sharing problems of an airstrip among airlines (Littlechild and
Owen 1973; Thomson 2007, for a survey of the literature). A bidding ring
problem (Graham et al. 1990) describes the situation where bidders form a
ring in a single-object English auction. The ring reduces or eliminates buyer
competition, thereby securing an advantage over the seller. The problem forced
by the members of the ring is to share the benet of their strategy. A liability
problem (Dehez and Ferey 2013) describes the situation where someone suf-
fers a cumulative injury that is caused by several persons in succession. Each
injuring party has taken a wrongful act after his predecessors wrongful act. A
wrongful act taken by the rst injuring party is the root of the injury. The in-
jured party is entitled to compensation. This problem is to determine how the
injuring parties should share the compensation. A polluted river problem (Ni
and Wang 2007) describes the situation where states are located along a river
and each state produces some pollutants. Each state is responsible for clean-
ing not only its own watercourse but also all downstream watercourses. The
problem is to determine how the states should share the total cleaning cost.
Fragnelli and Marina (2010) and Chun et al. (2012) axiomatized the Shapley
rule for airport problems. Considering these axioms in a duality relation, we
axiomatize the Shapley rule for liability problems, bidding ring problems, and
polluted river problems.
Finally, we apply the notion of anti-duality to claims problems, and a
certain class of public good problems. Claims problems deal with the situa-
tion where the liquidation value of a bankrupt rm has to be allocated between
its creditors, but there is not enough to honor the claims of all creditors. The
problem is to determine how the creditors should share the liquidation value
(ONeill 1982; Thomson 2003, for a survey of the literature). Public good
problems deal with the situation where a xed size of a public good can be
provided at a cost, and each agent consumes the public good. The social ben-
et is the di¤erence between the sum of benets of all agents and the cost of
the public good. The problem is to determine how the agents should share the
social benet. Using anti-duality, we uncover the hidden relationship between
the nucleolus rules (Schmeidler 1969) for claims problems and for public good
problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the notions
of duality and anti-duality for cooperative game theory. In Section 3, we
introduce the anti-dual of population monotonicity. On the domain of convex
games, we derive su¢ cient conditions under which this property is satised by
a single-valued solution. In Section 4, using duality, we axiomatize the Shapley
rule for bidding ring problems, liability problems, and polluted river problems.
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Finally, using anti-duality, we analyze the relationship between the nucleolus
rules for claims problems and for public good problems.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce the notions of duality and anti-duality for solutions and axioms
of cooperative game theory. There is a universe of potential agents, denoted
I N, where N is the set of natural numbers.2 LetN be the class of non-empty
and nite subsets of I, and N 2 N . A coalitional game with transferable
utility for N (a TU game for N , for short) is a function v : 2N ! R with
v(;) = 0. For all S 2 2N , v(S) represents what coalition S can achieve on its
own. Let VN be the class of TU games for N , and V  SN2N VN .
Given a TU game v for N and N 0  N , the subgame of v relative to
N 0, denoted vjN 0, is dened by setting, for all S 2 2N
0
, vjN 0 (S)  v(S). A TU
game v for N is convex if for all i 2 N and all S; T  Nnfig, S  T implies
v(S [ fig)   v(S)  v(T [ fig)   v(T ). Let VNvex be the class of convex
games for N , and Vvex 
S
N2N VNvex. A TU game v for N is balanced if for
all non-negative function  : 2N ! R+ such that for all i 2 N ,
P
S3i (S) = 1,
v(N) PS22N (S)v(S).
Let RN denote the Cartesian product of jN j copies of R, indexed by the
members of N . For all x 2 RN and all S 2 2N , let xS = (xi)i2S. A payo¤
vector for game v for N is an element x of RN with
P
N xi  v(N). A
solution, denoted ', is a mapping dened on some domain of games that
associates with each game in the domain a non-empty set of payo¤ vectors.
A solution is single-valued if it associates with each game in its domain a
unique payo¤ vector.
Given a game v for N , the dual of v, denoted vd, is dened by setting,
for all S  N ,
vd(S)  v(N)  v(NnS):
The number vd(S) is the amount that the complementary coalitionNnS cannot
prevent S from obtaining.
Let V be a class of games such that if v 2 V, then vd 2 V. Given a solution
' on V, the dual of ', denoted 'd, is dened by setting, for all v 2 V,
'd(v)  '(vd):
A solution ' on V is self-dual if for all v 2 V, '(v) = 'd(v).
An axiom is a desirable property of solutions. Two axioms are dual if
whenever a solution satises one of them, the dual of this solution satises the
other. An axiom is self-dual if it is its own dual.
2We use  for weak set inclusion, and  for strict set inclusion.
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Given a game v for N , the anti-dual of v, denoted vad, is dened by
setting, for all S  N ,
vad(S)   vd(S):
Let V be a class of games such that if v 2 V, then vad 2 V. The class of
balanced games and the class of convex games satisfy this property. Given a
solution ' on V, the anti-dual of ', denoted 'ad, is dened by setting, for
all v 2 V,
'ad(v)   '(vad):
A solution ' on V is self-anti-dual if for all v 2 V, '(v) = 'ad(v).3 Two
axioms are anti-dual if whenever a solution satises one of them, the anti-
dual of this solution satises the other. An axiom is self-anti-dual if it is
its own anti-dual.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship between vd and vad. In Fig.1,
the horizontal arrows show the opposite-sign relation. For instance, vad is vd
3The denition of self-anti-dual solutions implies that ' is e¢ cient, i.e.
P
N 'i(v) =
v(N).
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with the opposite sign. In the left picture, the vertical arrow shows the duality
relation. For instance, vd is dual of v, and v is dual of vd. Similarly, vad is dual
of  v, and  v is dual of vad. In the right picture, the vertical arrow shows
the anti-duality relation. For instance, vad is anti-dual of v, and v is anti-dual
of vad. Similarly, vd is anti-dual of  v, and  v is anti-dual of vd. In Fig.2,
the horizontal arrow shows the duality relation. The vertical arrow shows the
anti-duality relation. Fig.2 summarizes the observation of Fig.1.
Finally, we introduce well-known solutions for TU games. The core (Gillies
1959) is dened as follows: for all N 2 N and all v 2 VN ,
C(v) 
n
x 2 RN
 X
i2N
xi = v(N) and for all S  N ,
X
i2S
xi  v(S)
o
:
The core of v for N is not empty if and only if the game v is balanced.
The Shapley value (Shapley 1953) is dened as follows: for all N 2 N ,
all v 2 VN , and all i 2 N ,
Shi(v) 
X
SN
S 63i
jSj!(jN j   jSj   1)!
jN j!

v(S [ fig)  v(S):
On the domain of convex games, the core is never empty, and the Shapley
value is a selection from the core.
Given N 2 N and v 2 VN , let I(v) be the set of vectors x 2 RN such
that for all i 2 N , xi  v(fig), and
P
N xi = v(N). For all x 2 I(v), let
e(v; x) 2 R2N be dened by setting, for all S  N , eS(v; x)  v(S) 
P
S xi.
For all z 2 R2N , (z) 2 R2N is dened by rearranging the coordinates of z in
non-increasing order. For all z 2 R2N , z is lexicographically smaller than
z0 if 1(z) < 1(z0) or [1(z) = 1(z0) and 2(z) < 2(z0)] or [1(z) = 1(z0)
and 2(z) = 2(z0) and 3(z) < 3(z0)], and so on. The nucleolus (Schmeidler
1969) is dened as follows:
Nu(v) 
n
x 2 I(v)
 For all y 2 I(v)nfxg, e(v; x) islexicographically smaller than e(v; y) o:
The nucleolus is a single-valued solution. On the domain of convex games, the
nucleolus is a selection form the core.
3 Anti-dual of population monotonicity
In this section, we deal with a single-valued solution, denoted ', on some
domain of games. We write x = '(v) instead of fxg = '(v).
Population monotonicity says that for all game v 2 VN and all subgames
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vjN 0 2 VN 0, if agents play in vjN 0, then the payo¤s to the agents in v have to
increase.
Population monotonicity: For allN;N 0 2 N such thatN 0  N , all v 2 VN ,
and all i 2 N 0, 'i(vjN 0)  'i(v).
We introduce another monotonic property. We start with some game v for
N 2 N . Next, we consider the game vc played by N 0  N . The worth of each
coalition S  N 0 is equal to the contribution of S to NnN 0 in v. This property
says that in the game vc, the payo¤s to the members of N 0 have to be at least
as large as in v.
Coalitional contribution monotonicity: For all N;N 0 2 N such that
N 0  N , all v 2 VN , all vc 2 VN 0 such that for all S  N 0 vc(S)  v(S [
(NnN 0))  v(NnN 0), and all i 2 N 0,
'i(v
c)  'i(v):
We clear that if v is convex, so is vc.
Claim 1 For all N;N 0 2 N such that N 0  N , all v 2 VNvex, and all S  N 0,
vc(S)  v(S [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0). Then, vc 2 VN 0vex.
Proof of Claim 1. A game is convex if for all S; T  N , v(S) + v(T ) 
v(S [ T ) + v(S \ T ). For all S; T  N 0,
vc(S) + vc(T )
= v(S [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0) + v(T [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0)
 v ((S [ (NnN 0)) [ (T [ (NnN 0)))  v(NnN 0)
+v ((S [ (NnN 0)) \ (T [ (NnN 0)))  v(NnN 0)
= v ((S [ T ) [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0)
+v ((S \ T ) [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0)
= vc(S [ T ) + vc(S \ T ),
the desired conclusion.
Using the anti-duality operator, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 On the domain of convex games, population monotonicity and
coalitional contribution monotonicity are anti-dual properties.
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Proof. Let ' be a population monotonic solution on VNvex. Let N 0  N . Let
v 2 VNvex, x  'adN 0(v) and y  'ad(vjN 0).4 For all S  N 0, w(S)  vadjN 0(S).
By the denition of 'ad,  x  'N 0(vad) and  y  '(w). Note that vad 2 VNvex
and w 2 VN 0vex. Since ' is population monotonic, for all i 2 N 0, 'i(w)  'i(vad).
By the denition of 'ad, for all i 2 N 0, 'adi (wad)  'adi (v).
For all S  N 0,
wad(S) =  w(N 0) + w(N 0nS)
= vdjN 0(N 0)  vdjN 0(N 0nS)
= v(N)  v(NnN 0)  v(N) + v(Nn(N 0nS))
= v(S [ (NnN 0))  v(NnN 0),
the desired conclusion.
The following properties of solutions are well known (e.g., Peleg and Sud-
hölter 2003).
E¢ ciency: For all N 2 N , and all v 2 VN , PN 'i(v) = v(N).
Individual rationality: For all N 2 N , all v 2 VN , and all i 2 N , 'i(v) 
v(fig).
Reasonableness: For all N 2 N , all v 2 VN , and all i 2 N , 'i(v) 
v(N)  v(Nnfig).5
Lemma 1 On the domain of convex games, (i) e¢ ciency is self-anti-dual, and
(ii) individual rationality and reasonableness are anti-dual properties.
Proof. Immediately from the denition of anti-duality.
For all N;N 0 2 N such that N 0  N , and all v 2 VN , the self-reduced
game of v relative to ' and N 0, denoted r'N 0(v), is dened by setting, for
all S  N 0,
r'N 0(v)(S) 
8<:
v(N) PNnN 0 'i(v) if S = N 0
v (S [ (NnN 0)) PNnN 0 'i(v S[(NnN 0) ) if S 6= ;;
0 if S = ;:
4Note that 'adN 0 (v) 
 
'adi (v)

i2N 0 .
5On the domain of convex games, it is reasonableness from above(Milnor 1952).
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We require that the outcome a solution chooses for each game in VN should
be equal to the outcome chosen by the solution for the self-reduced game rela-
tive to ' and N 0.6
Self consistency: For all N;N 0 2 N such that N 0  N , and all v 2 VN , we
have r'N 0(v) 2 VN
0
and for all i 2 N 0, 'i(r'N 0(v)) = 'i(v):
On the domain of all TU games, the Shapley value is self consistent. How-
ever, on the domain of convex games, it is not, since Vvex is not closed under
the self-reduction operator for this solution.
The following notion is a weaker notion:
Bilateral self-consistency: For all N;N 0 2 N such that N 0  N with jN 0j =
2, and all v 2 VN , we have r'N 0(v) 2 VN
0
and for all i 2 N 0, 'i(r'N 0(v)) = 'i(v):
On the domain of convex games, the Shapley value is bilaterally self-consistent.
Let us consider the following alternative notion of consistency.7
Transfer agreement consistency (Oishi et al. 2013): For all N;N 0 2 N
such that N 0  N , and all v 2 VN , if for all S  N 0,
~r'N 0(v)(S) 
8<:
v(N) PNnN 0 'i(v) if S = N 0;
v(S) +
P
NnN 0 'i(v
NnS) PNnN 0 'i(v) if S 6= N 0; ;;
0 if S = ;;
where vNnS is the game forNnS dened by setting, for all T  NnS, vNnS(T ) 
v(S [ T )  v(S), we have ~r'N 0(v) 2 VN
0
and for all i 2 N 0, 'i(~r'N 0(v)) = 'i(v).
We require the notion that weakens transfer agreement consistency by lim-
iting its application to subpopulation of two agents. The scenario underlying
the reduced game ~r'N 0 is as follows.
8 Imagine that agent i announces that he
will cooperate with anybody if he obtains v(fig). If some agents, who form
a coalition T  Nnfig, cooperate with agent i, the coalition fig [ T obtains
v(fig [ T ). Since the reward of agent i for his cooperation is v(fig), the coali-
tion T obtains the remainder v(fig[T )  v(fig). Thus, each agent j 2 Nnfig
plays vNnfig and obtains 'j(v
Nnfig). If agent i does not make this announce-
ment, each agent j 2 Nnfig obtains 'j(v). If agents i and k 2 NnN 0 agree that
the di¤erence 'k(v
Nnfig)  'k(v) should be transferred from agent k to agent
6The self-reduced game and self-reduced consistency are usually called HM-reduced
gameand HM-consistency, respectively (Hart and Mas-Colell 1989). We use the termi-
nology introduced by Thomson (1996).
7On the domain of all TU games, self-consistency and transfer-agreement consistency are
dual properties. For details, see Oishi et al. (2013).
8The scenario here is introduced by Oishi et al. (2013).
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i, then agent i obtains ~r'N 0(v)(fig) as dened above. The worth ~r'N 0(v)(fjg)
can be interpreted in the same manner. Bilateral transfer-agreement consis-
tency requires that what agents i and j get should be unchanged if such an
agreement between agents i and k 2 NnN 0 or between agents j and k 2 NnN 0
takes place.
Bilateral transfer-agreement consistency: For all N;N 0 2 N such that
N 0  N with jN 0j = 2, and all v 2 VN , we have ~r'N 0(v) 2 VN
0
and for all i 2 N 0
'i(~r
'
N 0(v)) = 'i(v):
Proposition 2 On the domain of convex games, bilateral self-consistency and
bilateral transfer-agreement consistency are anti-dual properties.
Proof. See Appendix.
Hokari and Gellekom (2002) identied the following su¢ cient conditions
for a solution to be population monotonic on the domain of convex games.
Proposition A (Hokari and Gellekom 2002) On the domain of convex games,
if a solution is e¢ cient, individual rational, and bilaterally self-consistent, then
it is population monotonic.
Corollary 1 On the domain of convex games, the Shapley value is population
monotonic (Sprumont 1990).
Using the anti-duality operator, we derive su¢ cient conditions for a solu-
tion to be coalitional contribution monotonic on the domain of convex games
from Hokari and Gellekoms conditions.
Proposition 3 (Anti-dual of Proposition A) On the domain of convex games,
if a single-valued solution is e¢ cient, reasonable, and bilaterally transfer-agreement
consistent, then it is coalitional contribution monotonic.
Proof. By Propositions 1 and 2, and Lemma 1.
On the domain of convex games Vvex, the Shapley value is self-anti-dual
(Oishi and Nakayama 2009, Theorem 2). On Vvex, it is e¢ cient, reasonable,
and bilaterally transfer-agreement consistent. Thus, the conditions stated in
Proposition 3 are satised by the Shapley value.
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4 Duality and anti-duality approach to alloca-
tion problems
In this section, we take the duality and anti-duality approach to an analysis
of rules for allocation problems. First, we axiomatize the Shapley rule for
several allocation problems using the notion of duality.9 Next, we analyze the
relationship between the nucleolus rules for claims problems and for public
good problems using the notion of anti-duality.
4.1 Duality, and anti-duality for allocation problems
We introduce the notions of duality and anti-duality for solutions and axioms
for allocation problems. An allocation problem for N is a pair (N; p),
where N 2 N is a nite non-empty set of agents and p = (pi)i2N is a prole of
parameters for N . For each i 2 N , the parameter pi is the benet or the cost
experienced by agent i 2 N when engaging in some economic activity. Let P
be the set of all allocation problems on N .
Given all S 2 2N , we denote by vP : P ! R2N a mapping that associates
with each allocation problem (N; p) in the domain the unique 2jN j-dimensional
vector whose S-component is the amount coalition S can obtain on its own. By
convention, vP (N; p)(;) = 0. The number vP (N; p) is the coalitional game
for N derived from the allocation problem (N; p).
Let VP be the class of all coalitional games derived from allocation prob-
lems P. Given (N; p) 2 P, an allocation for (N; p) is a vector x 2 RN such
that
P
N xi = vP (N; p)(N). Let X(N; p) be the set of allocations for (N; p).
A solution for coalitional games is a mapping  : VP ! RN that asso-
ciates with each coalitional game vP (N; p) in the domain a unique allocation
in X(N; p). We refer to the composite mapping '    vP as an allocation
rule, or simply a rule, for allocation problems on the domain of P .
For instance, we refer to the composite mapping '  Sh  vP as the Shapley
rule, and to the composite mapping '  Nu  vP as the nucleolus rule.
Given a rule ' on P, the dual of ', denoted 'd, is dened by setting,
for all (N; p) 2 P,
'd(N; p)  [(vdP )(N; p)]:
A rule ' on P is self-dual if for all (N; p) 2 P, '(N; p) = 'd(N; p). Two
axioms are dual if whenever a rule satises one of them, the dual of this rule
satises the other. An axiom is self-dual if it is its own dual.
Given a rule ' on P, the anti-dual of ', denoted 'ad, is dened by
9One can axiomatize the Shapley value for these problems by using the notion of anti-
duality. For simplicity of our analysis, we take the duality approach here.
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setting, for all (N; p) 2 P,
'ad(N; p)   [(vadP )(N; p)]:
A rule ' on P is self-anti-dual if for all (N; p) 2 P, '(N; p) = 'ad(N; p).
Two axioms are anti-dual if whenever a rule satises one of them, the anti-
dual of this rule satises the other. An axiom is self-anti-dual if it is its
own anti-dual.
4.2 Allocation problems
We consider the following classes of allocation problems.
4.2.1 Airport problems
There is a set of airlines for whom an airstrip they will jointly use is to be
built. Each airline owns one type of aircraft. Airlines have di¤erent needs
for airstrips, since they own di¤erent types of aircraft. An airstrip needed to
accommodate the largest aircraft is to be built. The problem is to determine
how to share the cost of the airstrip between the airlines (Littlechild and Owen
1973).
An airport problem is a pair (N; c), where N 2 N is the set of airlines
and c = (ci)i2N is the prole of cost parameters, namely ci is the construction
cost of the airstrip for airline i. We assume that the cost is increasing in the
length of the airstrip. For simplicity, we require that for each i 2 N , ci+1 < ci
with cn+1  0. Let C be the class of all airport problems on N .
Given (N; c) 2 C, the airport game is dened by setting, for all S  N ,
cA(N; c)(S)  max
i2S
ci.
For all S 2 2N , cA(N; c)(S) represents the cost of the airstrip needed to ac-
commodate the members of coalition S. It is equal to the cost of the airstrip
needed to accommodate the member of the coalition whose cost parameter is
the largest.
Let CA be the class of all airport games. Given (N; c) 2 C, an allocation
for (N; c) is a vector x 2 RN+ such that
P
N xi = maxN ci (which is equal to
c1). Let X(N; c) be the set of allocations for (N; c). A solution for airport
games is a mapping A : CA ! RN that associates with each airport game
cA(N; c) in the domain an allocation in X(N; c). We refer to the composite
mapping 'A  A  cA as a rule for airport problems. The Shapley rule
for airport problems is dened by 'ShA  Sh  cA.
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4.2.2 Bidding ring problems
An English auction is an oral auction in which an auctioneer initially sets
a bid at a sellers reservation price and then gradually increases the price
until only one bidder remains active. There is a set of buyers in a single-
object English auction. There is no asymmetry of information between the
buyers; that is, each buyer has information on the valuations of all buyers
for the object. The valuation of each buyer is positive, and all valuations are
di¤erent. The reservation price is zero. A bidding ring is formed by all buyers.
The bidding ring wins the auction by making the buyer whose valuation is the
highest the sole bidder. The benet of the ring membersstrategy is equal to
the valuation of this buyer. The problem for the members in the ring is to
determine how to share the benet of their strategy (Graham et al. 1990).
A bidding ring problem is a pair (N; c), where N 2 N is the set of
buyers and c = (ci)i2N is the prole of valuations for a single object, ci being
the valuation of buyer i. For simplicity, we require that for each i 2 N ,
ci+1 < ci with cn+1  0. Let C be the class of all bidding ring problems on N .
Given (N; c) 2 C, the bidding ring game is dened by setting, for all
S  N ,
vB(N; c)(S) =
(
c1  maxj =2S cj if S 3 1
0 if S 63 1,
where maxj =2N cj  0. The intuition is as follows: First, under the English
auction rule, it is a dominant strategy for each bidder to remain active until
bidding reaches his valuation. Second, any coalition including buyer 1 can win
the auction, and achieve the net benet c1 maxj =2S cj by making buyer 1 the
sole bidder in the coalition and his bidding c1. Finally, no coalition that does
not include buyer 1 wins the auction, and hence its net benet is 0.
Let VB be the class of all bidding ring games. Given (N; c) 2 C, an allo-
cation for (N; c) is a vector x 2 RN+ such that
P
N xi = c1. Let X(N; c) be
the set of allocations for (N; c) . A solution for bidding ring games is a
mapping B : VB ! RN that associates with each bidding ring game vB(N; c)
in the domain an allocation in X(N; c). We refer to the composite mapping
'B  B  vB as a rule for bidding ring problems. The Shapley rule for
bidding ring problems is dened by 'ShB  Sh  vB.
4.2.3 Liability problems
Someone su¤ers a cumulative injury that is caused by several persons in suc-
cession.10 Each injuring party has taken a wrongful act causing some damage,
and the sequence of wrongful acts has resulted in the injury. The injured
10We deal with the simplest case of liability problems introduced by Dehez and Ferey
(2013).
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party is entitled to compensation. The problem is to determine how to share
the compensation between the injuring parties (Dehez and Ferey 2013).
A liability problem is a pair (N; d), where N 2 N is the set of injuring
parties and d = (di)i2N is the prole of damage parameters such that for each
i 2 N , di > 0. Let D be the class of all liability problems on N .
The detail of the scenario underlying a liability problem is as follows: Some-
one su¤ers an injury. Agent 1 has taken a wrongful act that is the root of the
injury. Let d1 be the damage that agent 1 has caused. After agent 1s wrongful
act, agent 2 has taken a wrongful act. Without agent 1s wrongful act, agent
2s wrongful act would not have occurred. Let d2 be the additional damage
that agent 2 has caused. Agents 1 and 2 have caused the cumulative damage
d1+d2. After agents 1 and 2s wrongful acts, agent 3 has taken a wrongful act.
Without agents 1 and 2s wrongful acts, agent 3s wrongful act would not have
occurred. Let d3 be the additional damage that agent 3 has caused. Agents
1, 2, and 3 have caused the cumulative damage d1 + d2 + d3. The process
continues until agent n. The agents in N have caused the cumulative damage
d1 + d2 +   + dn.
Given (N; d) 2 D, the liability game is dened by setting, for all S  N ,
vL(N; d)(S) 
8<:
P
N dk if S = N;P(minNnS) 1
k=1 dk if S 3 1 and S  N;
0 if S 63 1,
where minS is the smallest number of S. For all S 2 2N , vL(N; d)(S) repre-
sents the cumulative damage that the agents in S have caused.
Consider a four-agent example (Fig.3). Let N = f1; 2; 3; 4g, and S =
f1; 2; 4g. Agent 4s wrongful act can only occur if agents 1, 2, and 3 have
committed wrongful acts. In this case, however, agent 4 does not cause any
damage. This is because agent 3 is not included in S. Thus, the cumulative
damage that the agents in S have caused is d1 + d2. In general, we denote by
(minNnS)   1 the last agent who appears in the sequence of wrongful acts
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that the agents in S have caused. For instance, the last agent in Fig.3 is agent
(minf1; 2; 3; 4gnf1; 2; 4g)  1, namely agent 2.
Let VL be the class of all liability games. Given (N; d) 2 D, an allocation
for (N; d) is a vector x 2 RN+ such that
P
N xi =
P
N di. Let X(N; d) be the
set of allocations for (N; d). A solution for liability games is a mapping
L : VL ! RN that associates with each liability game vL(N; d) in the domain
an allocation in X(N; d). We refer to the composite mapping 'L  L  vL as
a rule for liability problems. The Shapley rule for liability problems
is dened by 'ShL  Sh  vL.
4.2.4 Polluted river problems
Imagine a line divided into several segments. Each segment (or watercourse)
belongs to each state. The water ows from the most upstream state to the
most downstream state. Each state produces some amount of pollutants. Each
state is responsible for cleaning not only its own watercourse but also all down-
stream watercourses. The problem is to determine how to share the total
cleaning cost between the states (Ni and Wang 2007).
A polluted river problem is a pair (N; d), where N 2 N is the set of
states and d = (di)i2N is the prole of pollutants parameters such that for each
i 2 N , di > 0. Let D be the class of all polluted river problems on N .
Given (N; d) 2 D, the polluted river game (simply, the river game)
is dened by setting, for all S  N ,
cR(N; d)(S) =
nX
minS
di:
For all S 2 2N , cR(N; d)(S) represents the total cleaning cost that all down-
stream states of S need.11
Let CR be the class of all river games. Given (N; d) 2 D, an allocation
for (N; d) is a vector x 2 RN+ such that
P
N xi =
P
N di. Let X(N; d) be
the set of allocations for (N; d). A solution for river games is a mapping
R : CR ! RN that associates with each river game cR(N; d) in the domain an
allocation in X(N; d). We refer to the composite mapping 'R  R  cR as a
rule for polluted river problems. The Shapley rule for polluted river
problems is dened by 'ShR  Sh  cR.
4.2.5 A three-dimensional box for coalitional games and rules
Next, we observe the duality between TU games derived from the allocation
problems mentioned above.
11This game is derived from the notion of downstream responsibility (Ni and Wang
2007).
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Remark 1 The following assertions hold:
(i) The class CA of airport games and the class VB of bidding ring games are
dual.
(ii) The class VL of liability games and the class CR of river games are dual.
(iii) The Shapley value of airport games on the domain CA coincides with that
of bidding ring games on the domain VB.
(iv) The Shapley value of liability games on the domain VL coincides with that
of river games on the domain CR.
The proof of (i) and (ii) follows from simple calculation. The proof of (iii)
and (iv) follows from the self-duality of the Shapley value.
In the following remark, we uncover the hidden structure of the Shapley
rules for allocation problems mentioned above.
Remark 2 The following assertions hold:
(i) There exists a bijection f : D ! C such that for all N 2 N and all i 2 N ,
ci = di + di+1 +   + dn.
Using the bijection f dened in (i), the following assertions hold:
(ii) For all (N; d) 2 D, cA(f(N; d)) = cR(N; d), and for all (N; c) 2 C,
cR(f
 1(N; c)) = cA(N; c).
(iii) For all (N; d) 2 D, vB(f(N; d)) = vL(N; d), and for all (N; c) 2 C,
vL(f
 1(N; c)) = vB(N; c).
(iv) For all (N; d) 2 D, 'ShA (f(N; d)) = 'ShB (f(N; d)) = 'ShL (N; d) = 'ShR (N; d).
(v) For all (N; c) 2 C, 'ShA (N; c) = 'ShB (N; c) = 'ShL (f 1(N; c)) = 'ShR (f 1(N; c)).
Using the bijection f dened in (i), we can associate to a river game on the
domain CR an airport game on the domain CA as follows12: For all N 2 N ,
all (N; d) 2 D, and all i 2 N , let ci = fi(N; d) = di + di+1 +    + dn. An
airport game cA 2 CA is rewritten by setting, for all S  N , cA(f(N; d))(S) =
maxS[di + di+1 +    + dn] =
Pn
minS di, which is a river game cR(N; d). We
can also associate to an airport game on the domain CA a river game on the
domain CR as follows: For all N 2 N , all (N; c) 2 C, and all i 2 N , let
di = f
 1
i (N; c) = ci  ci+1 with cn+1  0. A river game cR 2 CR is rewritten by
setting, for all S  N , cR(f 1(N; c))(S) =
Pn
minS[ci ci+1] = maxS ci, which is
an airport game cA(N; c). Similarly, using the bijection f , we can associate to
a liability game on the domain VL a bidding ring game on the domain VB, and
we can associate to a bidding ring game on the domain VB a liability game on
the domain VL. The assertions (iv) and (v) in Remark 2 follow from Remark
1 (iii)-(iv) and Remark 2 (ii)-(iii).
12This observation was pointed out by van den Brink and van der Laan (2008).
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In Fig.4, the three-dimensional box illustrates the duality relation between
the classes of allocation problems mentioned above. It summarizes the obser-
vations in Remarks 1 and 2.
4.3 Duality approach to bidding ring problems
In the literature, the Shapley rule for bidding ring problems has not been
axiomatized. Just by identifying the dual of each axiom involved in an axiom-
atization of 'ShA , we obtain an axiomatization of '
Sh
B .
Let us consider the dual of each axiom involved in the axiomatization of
the Shapley rule for airport problems (Chun et al. 2012).
First, we consider the following property. Each airline i has the right to
use at least the airstrip to accommodate the airline i. It says that each airline
i should pay at least an equal share of ci.
Equal share lower bound for airport problems: For all (N; c) 2 C and
all i 2 N ,
'A[i](N; c) 
ci
n
:
The dual of the equal share lower bound says that each buyer i 2 N should
gain at least an equal share of his valuation between all buyers. It is self-dual.
Equal share lower bound for bidding ring problems: For all (N; c) 2 C
and all i 2 N ,
'B[i](N; c) 
ci
n
:
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Next, we consider the following property for airport problems. It requires
that if the cost of an airline increases, then all the other airlines should pay at
most as much as they did initially.
Individual monotonicity for airport problems: Fix an arbitrary N 2 N .
For all (N; c) 2 C, all (N; c0) 2 C, and all i 2 N , if c0i > ci, and for all
j 2 Nnfig, c0j = cj, then for all j 2 Nnfig,
'A[j](N; c
0)  'A[j](N; c):
The dual of individual monotonicity says that if the valuation of a buyer
increases, then all the other buyers should share at most as much as they did
initially. It is self-dual.
Individual monotonicity for bidding ring problems: Fix an arbitrary
N 2 N . For all (N; c) 2 C, all (N; c0) 2 C, and all i 2 N , if c0i > ci, and for all
j 2 Nnfig, c0j = cj, then for all j 2 Nnfig,
'B[j](N; c
0)  'B[j](N; c):
Our nal property for airport problems says that if a new airline arrives,
then all airlines whose costs are more than the cost of the new airline should
be a¤ected equally.
Population fairness for airport problems: For all N 2 N , all (N; c) 2 C,
all i 2 InN , all j; k 2 N such that minfcj; ckg > ci,
'A[j](N [ fig; cN[fig)  'A[j](N; c) = 'A[k](N [ fig; cN[fig)  'A[k](N; c).
The dual of population fairness says that if a new buyer arrives, then all
buyers whose evaluations are more than the valuation of the new buyer should
be a¤ected equally. It is self-dual.
Population fairness for bidding ring problems: For all N 2 N , all
(N; c) 2 C, all i 2 InN , all j; k 2 N such that minfcj; ckg > ci,
'B[j](N [ fig; cN[fig)  'B[j](N; c) = 'B[k](N [ fig; cN[fig)  'B[k](N; c).
Thus, we obtain the following axiomatization of solution 'ShB that is dual
of the axiomatization of solution 'ShA .
Theorem A (Chun et al. 2012) For airport problems, the Shapley rule is the
only rule satisfying the equal share lower bound, individual monotonicity, and
population fairness.
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Theorem 1 (Self-dual of Theorem A) For bidding ring problems, the Shap-
ley rule is the only rule satisfying the equal share lower bound, individual
monotonicity, and population fairness.
4.4 Duality approach to liability problems and polluted
river problems
In the literature, the Shapley rule for liability problems has not been axioma-
tized. We will derive an axiomatization of it.
Our strategy is simple. Fragnelli andMarina (2010) characterized the Shap-
ley rule for airport problems by three properties: the equal share lower bound,
the equal share upper bound, and last-airline consistency.13 For all N 2 N ,
each property depends only on the prole of parameters c. By Remark 2-(iv),
we have that for all (N; d) 2 D, Sh  vL(N; d) = Sh  cA(f(N; d)). Using
Fragnelli and Marinas characterization, we derive axioms that allow an ax-
iomatization of Sh  vL(N; d).
Our rst property is as follows: The contribution of agent i to the cumula-
tive injury is the di¤erence between the entire damage (i.e. d1+ d2+   + dn)
and the cumulative damage that the agents except for agent i have caused
(i.e. d1 + d2 +    + di 1). Thus, we refer to di + di+1 +    + dn as agent is
contribution to the cumulative injury. The following property requires that
each agent i 2 N should pay at least an equal share of his contribution to the
cumulative injury.
Equal share lower bound for liability problems: For all (N; d) 2 D and
all i 2 N ,
'L[i](N; d) 
di + di+1 +   + dn
n
:
Next, we consider the following property for airport problems. Each airline
i 2 N needs an airstrip of cost at least ci. On the other hand, airlines i+1; i+
2;    ; n could free ride on airline i since the cost of the airstrip to accommodate
them is less than ci. The following property requires that airline i should pay
at most an equal share of ci between the airlines without free riders.
Equal share upper bound for airport problems: For all (N; c) 2 C and
all i 2 N ,
'A[i](N; c) 
ci
i
:
13In our model, the last-airlineis airline n since c1 > c2    > cn. In the literature (for
instance, Thomson 2007), the airline that needs the shortest airstrip is often referred to as
airline 1 (the rst-airline) under the assumption that cn > cn 1    > c1.
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Our next property for liability problems is as follows: The sequential wrong-
ful acts from agent 1 to agent i   1 has triggered agent is wrongful act. On
the other hand, agents i + 1; i + 2;    ; ns wrongful acts are not the cause of
agent is wrongful act. The following property requires that agent i should pay
at most an equal share of his contribution to the cumulative injury between
agents 1; 2;    ; i.
Equal share upper bound for liability problems: For all (N; d) 2 D and
all i 2 N ,
'L[i](N; d) 
di + di+1 +   + dn
i
:
Finally, we consider the following property for airport problems. Imagine
that airline n pays the cost 'A[n](N; c) and leaves. Furthermore, imagine that
'A[n](N; c) is used to cover the cost of construction for the segment airline n
uses. Airline ns contribution to the segment it uses implies contributing to
the segments each airline i 2 Nnfng uses. Thus, the cost parameter of airline
i 2 Nnfng is adjusted to c0i = ci   'A[n](N; c). It says that the outcome the
rule chooses for each problem should be invariant under the departure of the
last airline.
Last-airline consistency: For all (N; c) 2 C with n  2, and all i 2 N 0,
'A[i](N; c) = 'A[i](N
0; c0),
where N 0 = Nnfng, c0i = ci   'A[n](N; c) for all i 2 N 0, and (N 0; c0) 2 C.
Our nal property for liability problems is as follows: Imagine that agent n
pays the compensation 'L[n](N; d) and leaves. Furthermore, imagine that the
remaining damage dn   'L[n](N; d) is added to the additional damage caused
by agent n   1. As a result, the additional damage caused by agent n   1
is adjusted to dn 1 + dn   'L[n](N; d). The following property requires that
the outcome the rule chooses for each problem should be invariant under the
departure of the last-injuring party.
Last-injuring party consistency: For all (N; d) 2 D with n  2, and all
i 2 N 0,
'L[i](N; d) = 'L[i](N
0; d0),
where N 0 = Nnfng and d0 = (d1; d2;    ; dn 2; dn 1 + dn   'L[n](N; d)) 2 D:
Thus, we obtain the following axiomatization of solution 'ShL .
Theorem B (Fragnelli and Marina 2010) For airport problems, the Shapley
rule is the only rule satisfying the equal share lower bound, the equal share
upper bound, and last-airline consistency.
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Theorem 2 (Related dual of Theorem B) For liability problems, the Shapley
rule is the only rule satisfying the equal share lower bound, the equal share
upper bound, and last-injuring party consistency.14
By identifying the dual of each axiom in Theorem 2, we obtain a new
axiomatization of the Shapley rule for polluted river problems.
Our rst property is as follows: Since each state i 2 N is responsible
for not only its own cleaning cost but also all downstream costs, we refer to
di + di+1 +   + dn as state is responsibility. The following property requires
that each state i should pay at least an equal share of his responsibility. It is
self-dual.
Equal share lower bound for polluted river problems: For all (N; d) 2 D
and all i 2 N ,
'R[i](N; d) 
di + di+1 +   + dn
n
:
Our next property for polluted river problems is as follows: Since the up-
stream states of state i, states 1; 2;    ; i 1, are responsible for all downstream
costs, they share the responsibility for di+ di+1+   + dn. On the other hand,
the downstream states of state i, states i+ 1; i+ 2;    ; n, are not responsible
for di + di+1 +    + dn. The following property requires that state i should
pay at most an equal share of his responsibility for cleaning between states
1; 2;    ; i. It is self-dual.
Equal share upper bound for polluted river problems: For all (N; d) 2
D and all i 2 N ,
'R[i](N; d) 
di + di+1 +   + dn
i
:
Our nal property for polluted river problems is as follows: Imagine that
state n pays the cost 'R[n](N; d) and leaves. Furthermore, imagine that the
remaining pollutant dn 'R[n](N; d) is added to the pollutant caused by state
n   1. As a result, the pollutant caused by state n   1 is adjusted to dn 1 +
dn   'R[n](N; d). The following property requires that the outcome the rule
chooses for each problem should be invariant under the departure of the last-
watercourse state. It is self-dual.
Last-watercourse state consistency: For all (N; d) 2 D with n  2, and
all i 2 N 0,
'R[i](N; d) = 'R[i](N
0; d0),
14Theorem 2 is not dual of Theorem B, since it does not deal with an axiomatization of the
Shapley rule for bidding ring problems. However, this theorem is derived from the duality
between the liability game and the river game, and from Remark 2-(ii). In this sense, it is
related dual of Theorem B.
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where N 0 = Nnfng and d0 = (d1; d2;    ; dn 2; dn 1 + dn   'R[n](N; d)) 2 D:
Theorem 3 (Self-dual of Theorem 2) For polluted river problems, the Shapley
rule is the only rule satisfying the equal share lower bound, the equal share upper
bound, and last-watercourse state consistency.
4.5 Anti-duality approach to claims problems and pub-
lic good problems
As an application of the anti-duality approach to an analysis of rules for allo-
cation problems, we consider claims problems and public good problems. We
uncover the hidden relationship between the nucleolus rules for claims prob-
lems and for public good problems.
Imagine the situation where the liquidation value of a bankrupt rm has
to be allocated between its creditors, but this resource cannot be jointly hon-
ored. The problem is to determine how to share the liquidation value (or, the
endowment) between the creditors (ONeill 1982).
A claims problem is a pair (c; E) 2 RN+ R+ such that
P
N ci  E. The
number ci is the claim of creditor i on the endowment E. An allocation,
referred to as an awards vector, for (c; E) is a vector x 2 RN+ such thatP
N xi = E. Let C
N be the class of all claim problems for N .
Given (c; E) 2 CN , the claims game is dened by setting, for all S  N ,
vCL(c; E)(S) = max
8<:0; E   X
i2NnS
ci
9=; :
For all S 2 2N , the number vCL(c; E)(S) represents the di¤erence between the
endowment and the sum of claims of the creditors who form the complementary
coalition NnS (or 0, if this di¤erence is negative). This amount is conceded
by the complementary coalition NnS.
Let VCL be the class of all claims games. Given (c; E) 2 CN , let X(c; E)
be the set of awards vectors for (c; E). A solution for claims games is a
mapping CL : VCL ! RN that associates with each claims game vCL(c; E) in
the domain an awards vector in X(c; E). We refer to the composite mapping
'CL  CL  vCL as a rule for claims problems. The nucleolus rule for
claims problems is dened by 'NuCL  Nu  vCL.
Concede-and-divide, denoted CD(c; E), is a rule for the two-claimant
case. First, it assigns to each creditor i 2 N with jN j = 2 the di¤erence
maxfE   cj; 0g between the endowment and the other creditors claim (or 0,
if this di¤erence is negative). This amount is conceded by the other creditor
j. Next, this rule divides the remainder equally between them. As a result,
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for all i 2 N ,
CDi(c; E) = maxfE   cj; 0g+ E  
P
N maxfE   ck; 0g
2
:
A rule is concede-and-divide consistent if for all N 2 N , all (c; E) 2
CN , all i; j 2 N with i 6= j, if x = '(c; E), then (xi; xj) = '((ci; cj); xi + xj).
Theorem C (Aumann and Maschler 1985) For claims problems, the nucleolus
rule is the only rule that satises concede-and-divide consistency.
Next, we consider the following public good problems: Imagine the situ-
ation where a xed size of a public good can be provided at a cost, and each
agent consumes the public good. The social benet is the di¤erence between
the sum of benets of all agents and the cost of the public good. The problem
is to determine how to share the social benet between the agents.
A public good problem is a pair (c; E) 2 RN+R+ such that
P
N ci  E.
The number ci is the benet of agent i who consumes the public good. The
public good can be provided at a cost E. The social benet is given byP
N ci   E. An allocation for (c; E) is a vector x 2 RN+ such that
P
N xi =P
N ci   E. Let CN be the class of all public good problems for N .
Given (c; E) 2 CN , the public good game is dened by setting, for all
S  N ,
vPG(c; E)(S) = max
(
0;
X
i2S
ci   E
)
:
For all S 2 2N , the number vPG(c; E)(S) represents the di¤erence between the
sum of benets of the agents who form the coalition S and the cost E (or 0, if
this di¤erence is negative).15
Let VPG be the class of all public good games. Given (c; E) 2 CN , let
X(c; E) be the set of allocations for (c; E). A solution for public good
games is the mapping PG : VPG ! RN that associates with each public
good game vPG(c; E) in the domain an allocation in X(c; E). We refer to the
composite mapping 'PG  PG  vPG as a rule for public good problems.
The nucleolus rule for public good problems is dened by 'NuPG  Nu 
vPG.
Proposition B (Oishi and Nakayama 2009) The following assertions hold:
(i) Let w be the additive game given by setting, for all S  N , w(S) P
S ci. Then,
vadCL = vPG   w, and vadPG = vCL   w.
15The game vPG can be reinterpreted as a production game(see Dutta and Ray 1989,
pp.629-630).
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(ii) Nu(vCL) =  Nu(vadCL), and Nu(vPG) =  Nu(vadPG).
As Oishi and Nakayama (2009, see pp.564) pointed out, Proposition B
implies that for all (c; E) 2 CN , and all i 2 N ,
'NuPG[i](c; E) = Nu[i](vPG   w + w) = Nu[i](vPG   w) + ci
=  Nu[i](vCL) + ci = ci   'NuCL[i](c; E).
Thus, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 For all (c; E) 2 CN , 'NuPG(c; E) = c  'NuCL(c; E).
The scenario underlying this proposition is as follows: In each public good
problem, let us consider the situation where the agents have to share the cost
E between themselves. This cost-sharing problem is described by a claims
problem (c; E). Each agent i shares the cost 'NuCL[i](c; E), and thus his net-
benet is ci 'NuCL[i](c; E). Proposition 4 says that the each agents outcome the
nucleolus rule chooses for each public good problem is equal to the di¤erence
between his benet and his cost the nucleolus rule chooses for the corresponding
cost-sharing problem (i.e. the claims problem).
Remark 3 The public good game vPG is a claims game with the endowment E
being replaced by
P
N ci E. Given (c; E) 2 CN , for all S  N , vPG(c; E)(S) =
vCL(c;
P
N ci E)(S). By this observation together with Proposition 4, we have
that for all (c; E) 2 CN , and all i 2 N , 'NuCL(c; E) = c   'NuCL(c;
P
N ci   E).
This property says that the Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler 1985) is
self-dual in claims problems (see Thomson and Yeh 2008, pp.180).16
Given (c; E) 2 CN and a rule 'PG for public good problems, we refer to
c 'PG(c; E) as the cost allocation derived from a rule for public good
problems. By Theorem C and Proposition 4, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 4 The cost allocation derived from the nucleolus rule for public good
problems is the outcome the only concede-and-divide consistent rule chooses for
the corresponding claims problems.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Let ' be a single-valued solution on VNvex that
satises bilateral self-consistency. Let N 2 N , v be a convex game for N ,
and x  'ad(v). By the denition of 'ad, x =  '( vd). Let N 0  N with
jN 0j = 2, and w 2 R2N0 be such that for all S  N 0,
w(S) =
8<:
 vd(N) +Pi2NnN 0 xi if S = N 0;
 vd (S [ (NnN 0)) Pi2NnN 0 'i   vd S[(NnN 0)  if S 6= N 0; ;;
0 if S = ;:
Since ' satises bilateral self-consistency, w 2 VN 0vex and xN 0 =  '(w). Again
by the denition of 'ad, xN 0 = 'ad( wd).
First, we have
 wd(N 0) = vd(N) 
X
i2NnN 0
xi = v(N) 
X
i2NnN 0
'adi (v):
Next, for all S  N 0 with S 6= ;,
w(S) =  vd (S [ (NnN 0)) 
X
i2NnN 0
'i
  vd S[(NnN 0) 
=  v(N) + v (N 0nS) 
X
i2NnN 0
'i
  vd S[(NnN 0)  :
Thus, for all S  N 0 with S 6= ;, we have
 wd(S) =  w(N 0) + w(N 0nS)
= v(N) 
X
i2NnN 0
xi   v(N) + v (N 0n(N 0nS)) 
X
i2NnN 0
'i
  vd (N 0nS)[(NnN 0) 
=  
X
i2NnN 0
xi + v(S) 
X
i2NnN 0
'i
  vd NnS  ;
so that
 wd(S) = v(S) +
X
i2NnN 0
'adi

    vd NnS d  X
i2NnN 0
'adi (v):
Note that for all T  NnS,
 vd
NnS (T ) =  vd(T ) =  v(N) + v(NnT ):
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Thus, for all T  NnS,
 

 vd
NnS
d
(T ) =  ( vd
NnS)(NnS) + ( vd

NnS) ((NnS)nT )
= v(N)  v(Nn(NnS))  v(N) + v (Nn((NnS)nT ))
= v(S [ T )  v(S)
= vNnS(T );
the desired conclusion.
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